原発事故報告―危機を想定せぬ愚かさ

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（スラチャイ）

--The Asahi Shimbun, Dec. 27
EDITORIAL: Fukushima report highlights crisis management flaws
原発事故報告―危機を想定せぬ愚かさ

A report on an investigation into the Fukushima nuclear disaster has made us wonder if the operator of the crippled plant put blind faith in the facility because of the "safety myth" created by propaganda to promote nuclear power generation.
The interim report was published on Dec. 26 by a government panel looking into the disastrous accident at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant triggered by the March 11 earthquake and tsunami.
　原発ＰＲの安全神話によって原子力の当事者自身も安全ぼけに陥ってはいなかったか。
　福島第一原発をめぐる政府の事故調査・検証委員会中間報告を読むと、そう思わせる。

At the No. 1 reactor, members of the task force at the plant and the head office of Tokyo Electric Power Co., which operates the plant, initially failed to recognize that an isolation condenser, which is intended to cool the reactor during a blackout, was not working, according to the report.
　１号機では当初、停電時に炉を冷やす非常用復水器の機能が不全だったのを、発電所も東京電力本社も気づかなかった。

The report bitterly criticized TEPCO for lacking sufficient understanding of how the condenser works. "As a nuclear power plant operator, it was highly inappropriate," said the report. The fact indicates how little importance TEPCO engineers placed on such a system to deal with an emergency.
　装置のしくみを十分理解していなかったことを、中間報告は「原子力事業者として極めて不適切」と批判する。技術陣にとって、非常のための装置がどれほど遠い存在だったかわかる。

The interim report also addressed problems concerning facilities outside the plant, such as the off-site center located 5 kilometers away. The center failed to perform its functions as the front-line base to respond to a nuclear accident. That's because the center was not designed to function under circumstances of heightened levels of radiation even though it is a facility to be used when an accident has broken out at the nuclear power plant.
（中間報告書は原発から5kmのところにある外部センターについても言及している。
外部センターは原発事故の際に最前線となる機能を失っていた。
その原因は実際の原発事故に対応できる設計ではなかったことによる。）
（この部分の日本語なし、で、スラチャイが訳しました）

The document, naturally, also raised the issue of the fact that data of the government's System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI), a system to predict the spread of radioactive materials during a nuclear emergency, was not used for the evacuation of residents in areas around the disaster-stricken plant. The government "didn't have the thought of publicizing SPEEDI information," according to the report. Why did the government decide to spend taxpayers' money to build the system in the first place if it didn't think about communicating information it generates to local residents?
（政府肝いりの原発事故の際に使われるべきSPEEDIも、事故の際に使われなかった。
政府はSPEEDIのデータを公開していなかったのだ。
最初から国民のために使う気がないシステムを政府は何故導入したのか。アホか＾＾。）
（この部分の日本語なし、で、スラチャイが訳しました）

The inquiry panel also pointed an accusing finger at the prime minister's office. The report said there was not enough mutual communication between the underground crisis management center, where top officials of ministries and agencies concerned gathered, and the room on the fifth floor where the prime minister and his close aides worked to deal with the situation.
　報告は首相官邸も批判した。省庁幹部が集まる地下の危機管理センターと、首相らが陣取る５階との連絡が互いに十分でなかったと指摘している。

The report painted a distressing picture of how top officials at TEPCO and the government got flustered in the face of the nuclear crisis as they lacked knowledge about what to do in such a severe event. We applaud the investigation panel for shedding light on this disturbing truth. But the report has still left some stones unturned.
　見えてくるのは、大事故のときに、何をどう動かせばいいのかの知識に欠け、あたふたする東電と政府関係者の姿である。それを浮かび上がらせたことは評価したい。だが、まだ足りないところもある。

The report pointed to the possibility that the core meltdown at the No. 1 reactor could have been at least delayed through an earlier injection of water if the plant operator had had an accurate grasp of the situation. But it failed to make clear how missteps and errors in judgment actually worsened the damage.
　たとえば、１号機で状況把握が的確なら、早めの注水などで炉心損傷を遅らせられた可能性を述べているが、不手際や判断ミスが被害をどれほど広げたかは、はっきりと見えてこない。

We have some advice for the panel as it continues to prepare a final report to be published next summer.
　そこで、来年夏の最終報告に向けて注文したいことがある。

First of all, we urge the panel to be more willing to seek the help of outside experts. That the panel has no expert in nuclear reactors among its members is good from the viewpoint of insulating its work from the influence of the "nuclear village"--a close-knit community of policymakers, industry executives and scientists bent on promoting nuclear power generation. But its lack of necessary expertise could make it difficult for the panel to understand what happened in the reactors.
　まず、外部の知識を積極的にとり入れてほしい。委員に原子炉の専門家がいないのは、「原子力村」の論理を避けるためによいことだが、炉で何が起こったかを知るには困難もある。

We also want the panel to interview as many politicians involved as possible. This is also crucial for uncovering the truth about the SPEEDI fiasco.
　もう一つは、政治家からの聴取をどんどん進めてほしいことだ。これは、ＳＰＥＥＤＩ問題の解明にも欠かせまい。

Yotaro Hatamura, an engineer who heads the panel, advocates the "science of failure." The principal purpose of research in this field is to prevent big failures by examining small ones. It is important to scrutinize the many small failures that must have occurred during the nuclear disaster to learn necessary lessons. We hope the panel will step up its efforts to accomplish its mission during the remaining half year.
　検証委員会の委員長を務める工学者畑村洋太郎さんは、失敗学の提唱者だ。その核心は、小さな失敗を調べて大きな失敗を防ぐことにある。今回の原子力災害でも、その過程にあったとみられる数々の失敗を調べ、そこから教訓を得たい。あと半年の追い込みに期待する。