原発で支えられる砂上の楼閣

毎日新聞の力作。
経済技術大国の栄光におごった秀才たち（官僚と政治家）が悲劇をひきおこした。
政府と東電のちぐはぐな記者会見はノモンハン事件を彷彿とさせる。
ノモンハン事件のときには軍部により言論統制がなされていました。
今も政府や東電により報道管制（秘匿・隠匿）が一部ですが見受けられます。
国民に悪影響を与えるというのが理由ですが、よけいなお世話です。
国民が知りたいのは真実です。たとえそれがどんなに恐ろしいものでも。
幸いなことに、今の日本に言論統制はありません。
霞ヶ関、検察、政治家たちに向かってせめてブログを通して国民の思い（願い）を発信しましょう。
（スラチャイ記）

(Mainichi Japan) April 9, 2011
A society that depends on nuclear energy is just like a house of cards
風知草：特別編　津波が剥ぎ取ったもの＝山田孝男

A tsunami triggered by the March 11 Great East Japan Earthquake not only destroyed towns and ports in northeastern Honshu, but also demonstrated various problems involving Japan's post-war energy policy.
　津波が剥ぎ取ったものは三陸の街や港だけではない。

The nuclear power policy that the government had disguised as rock-solid has actually proved so vulnerable. Prosperity built around such a policy is fragile. This has illustrated a wide perception gap between people on the seriousness of the crisis.
無力なのに盤石を装ってきた原子力行政の虚妄。その砂上に築かれた繁栄の危うさ、事態の深刻さに対する国民の認識ギャップもあらわになった。

Even though people are calling for solidarity and collective efforts to overcome the disaster, nobody apparently has the impression that the groundwork has been laid for the restoration of Japan.
一致団結、総力結集と言葉は躍るが、日本復活の基盤が整ったという実感はない。

Late last week, I visited quake- and tsunami-ravaged areas in the Sanriku district along the Pacific coast of the Tohoku region -- Rikuzen-Takata in Iwate Prefecture, Kesennuma, Minami-Sanriku and Ishinomaki in Miyagi Prefecture, as well as the Fukushima Prefecture city of Soma. Many of these areas have been left in ruins. A large part of Kesennuma has been reduced to ashes by quake-triggered fires.
　先週末、遅ればせながら三陸を見てきた。陸前高田、気仙沼、南三陸、石巻。福島では相馬に入った。津々浦々が廃虚であり、火災を伴った気仙沼は焦土だった。

In sharp contrast, inland areas of quake-hit cities and towns remain intact. Residents of the Tokyo metropolitan area are losing their sense of crisis. No wonder that there is a wide perception gap on the seriousness of the disaster.
　だが、被災県も海岸から少し内陸に入れば無傷。まして首都圏の緊張はゆるみつつある。国民の意識に差が出るのも無理はない。

In an interview, former Fukushima Gov. Eisaku Sato emphasized that the nuclear accident is a man-made disaster. Sato, 71, is known as a staunch opponent of nuclear power generation.
　福島へ南下したついでに郡山まで足を延ばし、いまや原子力行政批判の代表的論客となった佐藤栄佐久・前同県知事（７１）に会った。

The former governor pointed out that the biggest problem involving the national government's nuclear power policy is that bureaucrats and power suppliers are under the wrong impression that nuclear power generation is absolutely safe and should be promoted by all means and that they keep problems involving such plants a secret. He thus asserted that efforts to invite electric power companies to build nuclear power plants in sparsely populated areas in a bid to create jobs for local residents are nothing but addictive drugs for regional communities.
　事故は人災です、と前知事は明快だ。「原発は安全。推進あるのみ」という官僚と電力会社の思い込みと秘密主義こそが問題であり、地域にとって原発誘致は麻薬でしかないと言い切った。

Sato served five terms as governor from 1988. Initially, he promoted the introduction of nuclear power plants, but a wide gap emerged between him and the national government as well as Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO), the operator of the tsunami-crippled Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant. After he resigned during his fifth tenure, he was arrested for accepting bribes and later indicted. He was convicted by the district and high courts, and has appealed the ruling to the Supreme Court.
　この人は８８年から知事を５期務めた。はじめは原発推進派だったが、しだいに国・東京電力との溝を深めた。５期目の半ばで辞任した直後、収賄容疑で逮捕・起訴。１、２審とも有罪で上告中の身だ。

It is inappropriate to jump to the conclusion that he was arrested as a result of a politically motivated investigation aimed at suppressing anti-nuclear power movements, but what he pointed out has been proven by various news reports.
　それが「反原発」つぶしの「国策捜査」だったかどうか、速断はできないが、前知事の指摘はすでに多くの報道で裏づけられている。

The government's Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) learned that a U.S. research institute had pointed to the possibility that the loss of an electric power source could lead to a reactor core meltdown, but disregarded it. The Fukushima Prefecture town of Futaba, which hosts the plant's No. 5 and 6 reactors, still suffers from huge budget deficits even though 30 years have passed since the power station was built.
　原子力安全・保安院は、電源喪失による炉心溶融の可能性を指摘した米国の研究機関の調査を把握していながら軽視した。原発のある双葉町は誘致３０年を経て巨額の財政赤字に苦しんでいる。

A historian who heard inconsistent announcements that the government and TEPCO made in their separate news conferences said the crisis is just like the "Nomonhan Incident," an armed conflict that broke out between Japanese and Soviet forces along the border between Mongolia and Manchuria, currently part of northeastern China, in 1939.
　話を聞きながら、先週、高名な現代史家からいただいた電話を思い出した。政府と東電のちぐはぐな記者会見を観察した歴史家の口から、「これはノモンハン事件じゃないですかね」という感想が飛び出した。
　ノモンハン事件とは１９３９（昭和１４）年、当時の満州国（現中国東北部）国境で起きた日ソ両軍の衝突だ。

Japan, which was overconfident of its military might after its victory in the Japanese-Russo War, underestimated Russia and went into another armed conflict with it. Even though Japanese soldiers on the battlefront were outstanding, Japan suffered a humiliating defeat because of inadequate instructions given by elite officers who did not know actual warfare.
日露戦争勝利で慢心した日本は不当にソ連を侮り、前線の奮闘にもかかわらず、実戦を知らないエリート将校たちの拙劣な指揮・指導で惨敗した。

The Japanese military covered up their defeat in the battle, and fought in the Pacific War without analyzing the cause of its failure in the incident, leading to its catastrophic defeat in World War II.
　日本軍は敗北を隠し、敗因を追究せず、続く太平洋戦争を同じ体制で戦い、亡国の結末を迎えた。

The Nomonhan incident raised questions as to whether Japan should seek to restore disaster-ravaged areas under the leadership of elite bureaucrats -- who were overly proud of Japan's prosperity as an economic and technological superpower -- without clarifying the cause of their mistake that led to the crisis.
経済技術大国の栄光におごった秀才たちの失敗を問わず、同じ陣容で漠然と復興を目指していいのかという疑問がわく。

At the time of the Nomonhan Incident, the Cabinet of Prime Minister Kiichiro Hiranuma was unable to control the Imperial Japanese Army and he was forced to step down after being tossed about in a complex international situation.
　ノモンハン事件当時の首相は平沼騏一郎だった。内閣は陸軍を制御できず、平沼は国際情勢にほんろうされて去った。

There are now calls urging the two major political parties -- the Democratic Party of Japan and the Liberal Democratic Party -- to form a grand coalition in order to facilitate their cooperation in overcoming the disaster. However, there is no point in forming a large ruling bloc that cannot control bureaucrats.
ひるがえって今日、大連立もけっこうだが、官僚の手綱をさばけない、形ばかりの総力体制を敷いたところで無意味ではないかという疑問をぬぐえない。

At Rikuzen-Takata, which has been left in ruin, work is under way to install new utility polls along National Route 45. The public has agreed that it is an urgent task to quickly restore utilities, but there is no consensus about a vision on what kind of society should be created after rebuilding destroyed infrastructure.
　見渡す限り廃虚の陸前高田市で、国道４５号沿いに新しい電柱を植え込む作業が進んでいた。ライフラインの復旧を急げという合意はあるが、それから先、どんな社会を築くのかという確かな合意はどこにもない。

The crisis has clarified that a society that depends heavily on electricity generated largely by nuclear power plants -- which Japan as a post-war economic and technological superpower has achieved -- is just like a house of cards. Japanese leaders as well as members of the general public should be aware of this. (By Takao Yamada, Expert Senior Writer)
　戦後の経済技術大国がたどりついた原発依存の「オール電化社会」は砂上の楼閣にすぎなかった。その現状認識が重要ではないか。

毎日新聞　2011年4月7日　東京朝刊